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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











SALLIE MAE EDUCATION LOANS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3:13-cv-00509) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 11, 2013 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 














 Dennis Lee Maxberry, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the 
District Court’s dismissal of his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  For 
the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm.
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I. 
 The facts being well-known to the parties, we set forth only those pertinent to this 
appeal.  Maxberry’s complaint is difficult to comprehend but it appears to allege that 
Sallie Mae breached its contract with him regarding his student loans to attend the Keller 
Graduate School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin by declaring him to be in default on the loans 
and then referring the matter to arbitration before Maxberry actually breached the 
contract.  Maxberry also seems to allege that Defendant Sallie Mae relied upon hearsay 
evidence and failed to give him notice in determining that he defaulted on his student 
loans, and that this prevented him from getting his grades and passing his classes at 
school.  Maxberry also alleges that this caused him to be dismissed from school even 
though he attended class every night and paid $66,000.00 in tuition which he received 
from Defendant Sallie Mae.  He also seems to aver that after he was dismissed from the 
school, he was immediately charged for the credits he took.  Maxberry seeks relief under 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 as well as Title IX of the Education Act of 1972, Title 
                                              
1
 We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may 
summarily affirm a decision of the District Court if the appeal does not raise a substantial 
issue.  3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.        
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VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
2
  The 
complaint also appears to contain state law breach of contract and fraud actions. 
The District Court dismissed all of Maxberry’s federal claims with prejudice and 
dismissed the state law claims without prejudice “so that Plaintiff can refile them in the 
proper court.”3  Maxberry filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II. 
 We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s decision to dismiss Maxberry’s 
claims pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 
2000).  In reviewing a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, “we accept as 
true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn from them, and we affirm the order of dismissal only if the pleading does 
not plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.”  Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 
539 F.3d 237, 242 (3d Cir. 2008).  A district court need not permit amendment of a 
complaint that is vulnerable to dismissal if amendment would be futile.  See, e.g., Phillips 
v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008).  We may affirm on any basis 
supported by the record.  See, e.g., Oss Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency, 617 
F.3d 756, 761 (3d Cir. 2010).  We are of course mindful that a pro se litigant’s complaint 
is to be construed liberally.  See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).   
                                              
2
 Maxberry checked the box labeled “False Claims Act” on his civil cover sheet but the 
text of the complaint does not contain any related matter.  As neither the District Court 
nor Maxberry made any subsequent mention of this claim, we will not discuss it here.   
3
 The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation in an 
order docketed on April 4, 2013.  For simplicity all lower court proceedings mentioned 
herein are attributed to the District Court. 
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To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint – even a pro se complaint – “must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  “A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id.  The facts must demonstrate that 
the Plaintiff is entitled to relief, not show just a “mere possibility of misconduct.”  Fowler 
v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal at 679).  “[A]n 
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is not sufficient for a 
complaint to survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Iqbal at 678.   
After analyzing Maxberry’s claims individually, the District Court found that in 
each instance Maxberry had failed to state a claim and that amendment would be futile.  
We agree with the District Court’s conclusions, either for the same or substantially 
similar reasons as given in the Report and Recommendation.   
We affirm the prejudicial dismissal of Maxberry’s claims pursuant to § 1983, Title 
IX, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  While we need not restate the analysis found in 
the Report and Recommendation, we note that these claims are valid only against a state 
actor or entity receiving federal assistance, and that Sallie Mae, as a publicly traded 
corporation, cannot satisfy these requirements.  The District Court therefore properly 
found that amendment would be futile. 
We also affirm the dismissal with prejudice of Maxberry’s Title VI and § 1985(3) 
claims.  Maxberry’s first mention of the fact that he is African-American, and thus a 
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member of a protected class, occurs in the brief he submitted to this Court upon being 
notified of possible summary action.  He does not allege that Sallie Mae treated him 
differently than similarly-situated borrowers who were not members of a protected class 
or that Sallie Mae conspired with anyone before declaring him to be in default.  Rather, 
Maxberry argues only in his brief that “Sallie Mae could have notified the plaintiff earlier 
that they would not allow him to attend but didn’t.  Instead they allowed the plaintiff to 
attend and then did not give ample grades for his work; which ran up the plaintiff’s loan 
amount to that of the present loan amount, and the past in a manner of compulsion.”  
Appellant’s Brief at 3.   
Even assuming the truth of these allegations, the pleading requirements of 
Twombly and Iqbal are not met.  Neither the complaint nor the brief adduces any 
evidence of racially-driven concerted action or animus.  Furthermore, we have no reason 
to believe that an amended complaint would survive a motion to dismiss.  Maxberry’s 
past litigation practices indicate that he is prone to making incomprehensible and 
unsubstantial filings, and the brief he submitted in this appeal confused rather than 
clarified the claims raised in his complaint.  While we are “mindful that direct evidence 
of a conspiracy is rarely available and that the existence of a conspiracy must usually be 
inferred from the circumstances..., the rule is clear that allegations of a conspiracy must 
provide some factual basis to support the existence of the elements of a conspiracy: 
agreement and concerted action.”  Capogrosso v. Supreme Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184-
85 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Crabtree v. Muchmore, 904 F.2d 1475, 1481 (10th Cir. 
1990)).  Nothing in Maxberry’s filings suggests agreement, concerted action, or 
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discriminatory intent on the part of Sallie Mae.  Therefore we agree with the District 
Court that amendment would be futile.   
A claim under § 1986 cannot survive without a valid § 1985(3) claim.  See Rogin 
v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 696 (3d Cir. 1980); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 
841 (3d Cir. 1976).  Becausee Maxberry’s § 1985(3) claim was dismissed with prejudice, 
the District Court was correct in dismissing his § 1986 claim with prejudice.   
The District Court found that it did not have diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332 because “neither Plaintiff nor Defendant Sallie Mae is a citizen of 
Pennsylvania….”  This is incorrect, as diversity jurisdiction is not dependent on either 
party’s being a resident of the forum state.  Rather, § 1332(a)(1) provides that “[t]he 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in 
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000…and is between citizens of different 
states.”  Maxberry’s complaint requests $1 million in damages.  Assuming that the 
required amount of money is indeed in controversy, we conclude that the District Court 
likely erred in determining that it did not have diversity jurisdiction.   
We can affirm the District Court’s dismissal without prejudice of Maxberry’s state 
law claims on other grounds, however.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to 
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.”  As stated above, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 663 
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp, 550 U.S. at 570).  The allegations “must not be ‘so undeveloped 
that [the complaint] does not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is 
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contemplated by [Fed. R. Civ. P. 8].’”  Umland v. Planco Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 
64 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 
2008)).  In this case, portions of Maxberry’s complaint are difficult to comprehend and 
border on being unintelligible.  Even if the facts Maxberry alleged in the complaint are 
taken as true, they do not amount to a plausible claim under any cause of action.  The 
complaint therefore does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8 or Twombly.  
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in dismissing the state law claims without 
prejudice. 
III. 
There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will summarily affirm.   
